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SELECTED TOPICS ON THE NEUROSCIENCE OF ALTERED PERCEPTIONS 
AND ILLUSORY BELIEFS 
ALEXANDER SEBASTIAN ROTH 
Six neuropsychological topics illustrating altered perceptions and illusory beliefs 
are explored with particular emphasis on the neurobiological underpinnings of such 
phenomena. The first five topics are phantom limb, out-of-body experiences including 
depersonalization and near-death experiences, delusions with an emphasis on the effects 
of psychedelic drugs, autonomic reflex actions including respiration and heartbeat, and 
virtual reality. The last topic focuses on three disorders impairing perception and 
cognition, namely, Anton-Babinski, Charles Bonnet, and Diogenes Syndromes. Many of 
the related neurobiological mechanisms reflect disturbances of both lower-level and 
multisensory processing along with specific cortical impairments such as at the 
temporoparietal junction. The latter has been linked, for example, to out-of-body 
experiences. Similarly, aberrant neural learning and signaling such as that based on 
synaptic receptor disturbances show how the interplay between lower-level brain activity 
and that in the prefrontal cortex contributes to delusions. Specific hypotheses set forth to 
explain these alterations in perception and cognition are reviewed, such as a remapping 
theory which depicts cortical reorganization in response to synaptic changes mediated by 
receptors. The effects of these perceptual/cognitive distortions on experiential 
pleasure/pain and on adaptability are also explored. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At first glance, one may not fully appreciate the similarities between phantom 
limbs, the effects of psychedelic drugs, and the sensory illusions produced by virtual 
reality technology. However, each of these phenomena demonstrates a significant 
alteration in normal perception and/or cognition. In addition, each of these shows how 
specific neurophysiological changes can dramatically distort phenomenological 
experiences. For example, the perception of missing limbs, delusions associated with 
psilocybin and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and experiences of ourselves as if in a 
world created by computers all reflect a combination of cortical and sensory signal 
aberrations. The purpose of this thesis is to show how six seemingly disparate sets of 
experiences reflect similar alterations in perception and/or cognition and to explore the 
neuropsychology and neural underpinnings of each of them. 
Each of the following topics will be reviewed: 
1. Phantom limbs, the persistent perception of missing body parts often limbs. 
2. Out-of-body experiences, in which there is perceived distortion in the spatial 
location of ourselves, including depersonalization, or detachment from our 
own being, near-death experiences, and altered consciousness at high 
altitudes. 
3. Delusions or false, nonveridical, but intensely felt beliefs, with particular 
focus on the effects of psychedelic drugs. 
4. Autonomic reflex action effects such as those from respiration and heart 
rhythms. 
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5. Influence of virtual reality technology on perceptual/cognitive changes.  
6. Three neuropsychological disorders, the Anton-Babinski, Charles Bonnet, and 
Diogenes syndromes. 
The impetus for my interest in exploring perceptual and cognitive distortions 
began during my time as a cognitive science major at Yale College. There, I became 
fascinated with the origins of some of these mental processing errors and why they have 
been maintained in the human mind over evolutionary time. In my senior thesis, I 
proposed a two-dimensional grid aimed at quantifying and improving our understanding 
of mental processing errors and distortions. It seemed advantageous both conceptually 
and quantitatively to suggest a unitary approach rather than to characterize 
misperceptions such as sensory-based illusions and cognitive misbeliefs separately. The 
first dimension placed all mental processing errors (or “mental misrepresentations,” as I 
described them) on a scale ranging from lower-level sensation to higher-level cognition. 
A second dimension attempted to capture the magnitude of the error, ranging from slight 
to severe. The unitary approach led me to seek a greater understanding of the 
neurophysiological mechanisms underlying both perceptual and cognitive distortions; I 
discovered many of these distortions share similarities and reflect the plasticity, 
interconnectivity, and only statistical localization of functions within the brain. My study 
of neuroscience during my work toward a Master’s of Science in Medical Science at 
Boston University further sparked my interest in the physiological bases for these 
misperceptions and illusory beliefs. This paper attempts in part to integrate those 
neurobiological mechanisms associated with mental processing deviations on the 
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perceptual-cognitive spectrum. Of course, many of the explored alterations have 
connections to both camps; many lower-level distortions are influenced by higher-level 
ones and vice versa. 
Each of the topics was selected in order to illustrate an especially interesting 
and/or dramatic perceptual/cognitive distortion and to highlight theories that explain 
some of the related underlying neurobiology. Many of these phenomena reveal altered 
states of consciousness in which people experience hallucinations or delusions. Some of 
these alterations such as those associated with high altitude changes and psychedelic 
drugs have the capacity to produce both pleasure as well as anxiety and distress. In all 
cases, relatively normal modes of perceiving and thinking are altered in ways that usually 
have significant and sometimes major life impact. For example, the deluded thinking of 
the Diogenes patient typically results in severe self-neglect and decline in quality of life. 
There also exist similarities in the neurological roots of the distortions, such as in 
disturbances in the connections between cortical and lower-level, sensory activity. 
Finally, case studies will be reviewed of those individuals who either experienced or 
suffered from such aberrations associated with each of the phenomena. Such research 
will underscore their often unusual experiences, individual psychology, and associated 
neurological activity. It is argued that these kinds of phenomena provide classic 
illustrations of the connections between subjective experience and neurophysiology. 
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I. PHANTOM LIMB 
In a neurological sense, “phantoms” are persistent memories or perceptions often 
of limbs or other bodily parts which have been missing sometimes for years. Such 
phenomena have been known since ancient times. After Lord Nelson lost his right arm in 
war, he suffered phantom limb pain which he cited as evidence for the existence of the 
soul. He reasoned that if an arm could survive physical loss, then why not the entire 
person (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000)? During the American Civil 
War, phantom limbs were studied in depth, given the number of amputees then. The 
neurologist Silas Weir Mitchell described various types of phantoms, including those 
experienced as ghostly and other-worldly, life-like, and distorted. He speculated about 
causes of these “body image” disorders related to damage in the central nervous system 
such as sensory cortex and parietal areas as well as peripheral changes such as in the 
“nerve-stump.” Central nervous system disorders such as strokes sometimes have seemed 
to eliminate phantom perceptions. For example, a sailor who lost a finger was plagued by 
the phantom perception of an intrusive, elongated finger for forty years. Then following a 
stroke, his phantom disorder was gone (Sacks, 2009). 
 
Descriptions and Case Studies: Recent explorations of connections between changes in 
cortical topography and perceptual experience have been promoted by the study of 
phantom limbs. Such analysis of phantom limbs has relied on psychophysical testing and 
functional magnetic resonance studies on patients with phantom limbs. Advances in 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) have produced localizations of processing that are quite 
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relevant to phantom limbs, as they have revealed detailed somatosensory maps of the 
face, hand, and other parts of the body. They have even been able to resolve cortical 
regions corresponding to individual digits (Gallen et al., 1993; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 
1998; Yang, Gallen, Schwartz, & Bloom, 1993). Certain MEG studies clearly 
demonstrate that remapping occurs in the human brain, just as such remapping has been 
previously demonstrated in monkeys (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). One interesting 
study using functional magnetic resonance imaging investigated the somewhat rare 
supernumerary phantom limb (SPL), in which patients with a severe stroke-induced 
sensorimotor deficit experience the illusory presence of an extra limb that duplicates the 
actual one. In one study, Khateb et al. (2009) explored the multimodal nature of the 
phantom which a patient claimed to be able to see, use, and move, intentionally. In 
particular, the right premotor and motor regions were engaged when this patient imagined 
that she was scratching her left cheek with her left plegic hand. When she did the same 
task with the SPL, more left middle occipital areas were used. Comparison of responses 
induced by left cheek versus right cheek with the SPL showed activation in right 
somesthetic regions. These findings showed that voluntary movements of a seen and felt 
SPL can activate premotor and motor areas at the same time with visual and sensory 
cortex. This observation in combination with the patient’s reports seemed to strongly 
support the multimodal dimension of the SPL. 
 With regard to phantom limbs, the concept of multimodality also seems 
appropriate to describe the frequent sensorimotor deficits following stroke in both the 
parietal lobe of the brain’s right hemisphere but also in individuals with subcortical brain 
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damage. Here Heydrich et al. (2017) describe a patient reporting an ictal postural 
phantom limb sensation of her right hand caused by dysplasia of the left temporoparietal 
junction. These authors then show how the patient suffered from impaired mental 
imagery of various body parts. They concluded that the observation of a selective deficit 
of mental imagery of body parts in this patient with dysplasia related to the patient’s ictal 
postural phantom sensation. These researchers also underscore the importance of the left 
temporoparietal junction in integrating bodily sensory information and in representation 
of the topological body map. 
 
Underlying Neural Mechanisms and Theories: Several neuroscientists have attempted 
to target the actual neural mechanisms underlying the perceptual remapping that has been 
consistently demonstrated. One of the suggested mechanisms of such brain 
reorganization relies on potentiation of synapses mediated by N-methyl-D-aspartate 
(NMDA) receptors that detect simultaneous activation of two inputs and strengthen the 
connection between the two (Bear, Cooper, & Ebner, 1987; Cramer & Sur, 1995; Kaas & 
Florence, 1996; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). With respect specifically to phantom 
limbs, numerous theories have been promulgated to explain them. The original standard 
explanation of phantom limbs is that such an illusion comes from irritation produced by 
scar tissue and neuromas of the stump (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). Some have 
even suggested that the phantom limb represents a kind of psychological denial or an 
unconscious wish expressed in a deformed way (Zuk, 1956). 
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 In contrast, Ramachandran and Hirstein (1998) first suggest that the illusion of 
phantom limbs arises in part from tactile and proprioceptive input from the face and 
tissues near the stump that take over in certain areas of the brain and possibly also in 
proprioceptive maps. Thus, discharges from these tissues are misinterpreted as coming 
from the absent limb and, therefore, are felt as a phantom limb. These authors further 
argue that the phantom limbs effects arise, in part, from various forms of remapping. This 
remapping hypothesis receives support from various studies reporting acquired focal 
brain lesion in the contralateral parietal cortex as producing a total disappearance of the 
sensation of phantom limb (Appenzeller & Bicknell, 1969; Bornstein, 1949; Bosch, 1991; 
Head & Holmes, 1911; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). However, these authors 
acknowledge that the remapping theory does not explain other observations such as why 
the phantom limb often has the same position that it did before the amputation. They then 
propose a broader, multifactorial model of the origin of phantom limbs: that the 
perception of phantom limbs relies on integrating experiences from at least five different 
sources including (1) stump neuromas, (2) remapping, such that the activity from the face 
is ascribed to the phantom, (3) corollary discharges from motor commands to the limb, 
(4) an internal image of the body, genetically determined, and (5) memories of often 
painful sensations of the original limb being carried over into the phantom one 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). 
 The “nature and nurture” behind theories explaining phantom limbs gives rise to 
such questions as whether phantom limbs arise chiefly from factors such as remapping 
and stump neuromas or whether they represent a persistence of a body image that is 
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largely genetically determined. As is often the case, perhaps the answer lies in an 
interaction between the two factors. An illustration of such interaction is the observation 
that some patients with congenitally missing limbs also experience phantoms 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). Poeck (1969) described a case of a child who was 
born with no forearms but experienced phantom hands below the stumps. She could 
move her phantom fingers and actually used them to count and solve math problems. 
 In addition to providing information on causes and mechanisms underlying 
phantom limbs, such studies have demonstrated important underlying principles of brain 
organization and function. Specifically, studies on phantom limbs affirm the general 
neural plasticity of the brain. Second, these studies give insight into how the activity of 
sensory maps leads to conscious experience—by how changes in cortical topography are 
related to perceptual changes. Thirdly, these studies allow for the exploration of 
“intersensory effects” and how the brain updates the body image through the life span 
(Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). 
 Some of these insights into brain organization have arisen from theories put forth 
to explain phantom limb phenomena. Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran (2000) 
studied patients with either arm amputation or brachial avulsion and discovered that 
nearly half of them referred sensation from the face to the phantom limb. In many, there 
was a topographically organized map of the hand on the lower part of face. In addition, 
the referred sensations were modality specific such that sensations like hot or cold were 
felt as hold or cold at localized points on the phantom limbs. It has already been known 
that stimulating trigger points near a stump can elicit referred sensations in the phantom 
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limb. Taking all results together, Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran (2000) 
developed their remapping hypothesis to describe how referred sensations develop as a 
consequence of changes in such topography following deafferentation. This hypothesis 
would be consistent with data showing how after amputation of the index finger in a 
patient, a map of the index finger was found to lie across the cheek (Aglioti, Bonazzi, & 
Cortese, 1994; Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000).  
 
Pain and Body Image Distortions: It has been long known that some patients suffer 
highly painful involuntary clenching spasms and other painful sensations in the phantom 
limb. For example, they experience nails digging into their phantom palm but cannot 
open the hand to relieve the pain (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). 
Individuals also have difficulty accepting shortened limbs or the introduction of artificial 
limbs or other foreign bodies. One of the main traits which distinguishes humans from 
other animals is the capacity to use tools which can be construed as detachable limbs. 
Trained individuals begin to identify themselves with their tools such as a motorist 
identifying with a car. However, sometimes pain is produced by contact of the tool with 
the body such as a dental plate or an artificial limb causing a gum ulcer or stump 
neuroma. In such cases, the dental plate or artificial limb is rejected as a foreign body. 
This example also illustrates the principles of how pain often predominates over adaptive 
functions (Riddoch, 1941). Ways to relieve such pain have also produced insights into the 
mechanisms underlying phantom pain. In particular, patients have been able to use visual 
feedback from mirrors to “unclench” such sensations in painful phantom limbs, and this 
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has seemed to relieve the experienced spasms (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 
2000). 
 It has also been demonstrated that phantom limb-like sensations are not unique to 
those with lost limbs. Those with intact limbs experience body image distortions. For 
example, one can project one’s sensations onto objects such as tables, chairs, and masks 
by using patterns of tactile stimulation (Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). 
If you watch someone stroking a table surface while simultaneously striking and tapping 
your knee hidden from you under a table, you may likely experience touch sensations as 
emerging from the table. If someone then hits the table with a hammer, you might 
register a strong galvanic skin response, as though the object was now a part of your body 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1997; Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). 
However, if the table and your hand are stimulated out of synchrony, illusion does not 
occur, and there is usually no galvanic skin response. Of course, many of these 
phenomena are used by hypnotists to achieve their desired effects. 
 Referred sensations in phantom limbs seem important for several reasons. They 
highlight neural plasticity and underscore that brain topography can be quite labile. This 
observation is in contrast with previous more static views of brain maps. It appears that 
even in the adult brain, major reorganization can happen fairly rapidly. Thus, these 
referred sensations can be used as “markers” of brain plasticity (Ramachandran & 
Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). Secondly, the study of phantom limbs allows us to 
connect subjective sensations and conscious experience to the activity in brain maps and 
to test previous assumptions of neurophysiology and sensory psychology (Ramachandran 
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& Hirstein, 1998; Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). Thirdly, the use of 
previously-referenced mirrors to provide feedback may be beneficial in alleviating 
strained postures and spasms in those with phantom limbs. It has been speculated that 
other neurological syndromes such as focal dystonias and hemipareses may be related to 
similar mechanisms underlying phantom limb pain. Thus, these disorders might 
potentially benefit from the use of such visual feedback. The study of phantom limbs then 
can serve as a model for exploring how the brain continuously updates its own construct 
of reality in response to new sensory data. It also suggests that the more static, modular, 
hierarchical model of the brain should be replaced with a more dynamic concept in which 
there are extensive interactions between different levels. As an illustration, signaling 
from the visual appearance of the moving phantom limb returns from the visual to the 
somatosensory regions of the brain to relieve a spasm in an absent hand (Ramachandran 
& Rogers-Ramachandran, 2000). Finally, distortions of body image in those with 
phantom limbs also suggest that views of one’s body may be less durable and permanent 
than previously thought. 
 
Phantom Limbs and Adaptability: One might also ask if such neural plasticity is 
beneficial or useful to the individual. On the surface, it would seem that neural plasticity 
on the whole would be adaptive in that it allows greater versatility and speed in 
responding to a variety of both internal and environmental stimuli. With respect to 
phantom limbs, perhaps the answer is more ambiguous. Chronic pain does not appear 
adaptive. However, one might ask if the larger cortical area devoted to the face after arm 
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amputation would lead to improved sensory discrimination on the face. Although one 
rarely if ever would wish for the loss of a limb or the experience of a phantom limb, there 
are likely better and worse ways to adapt to such an occurrence, both physiologically and 
psychologically. 
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II. OUT-OF-BODY AND RELATED ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS 
EXPERIENCES 
 
Out-of-Body Experiences: Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) have been defined as those 
experiences in which an individual is awake and sees his body and the environment from 
a location outside his physical body (Bünning & Blanke, 2005). Thus, the spatial unity of 
body and self is challenged by these phenomena where one’s self is experienced as 
having departed from the familiar position of being within one’s body. Similarly, the 
concept of a person swapping one’s body for another demonstrates the malleability of the 
basic sense of identity with one’s own body. For example, manipulation of the visual 
perspective along with associated multisensory data from the body was found to be 
sufficient to trigger the illusion that another’s body or an artificial one became one’s own 
(Petkova, 2008). In an OBE, one typically has the impression of viewing the world from 
an elevated position as well as seeing one’s own body from this perspective (autoscopy). 
OBEs have been found in literature through the ages, in, for example, mythology and 
accounts of spiritual experiences. In particular, body position seems to influence the 
occurrence of OBEs. For example, the supine position appears to favor the occurrence of 
OBEs under static circumstances. Imbalances during falls or rapid decelerations also 
seem to increase the likelihood of OBEs (Bünning & Blanke, 2005). 
Precipitating factors for OBEs have been studied and include sleep, drug abuse, 
and general anesthesia (Bünning & Blanke, 2005). Although there has been much 
exploration of the relationship between sleep/dreaming and OBEs, little work has been 
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done linking the neurophysiological relationships between the two. Some studies suggest 
that OBEs are particularly frequent during periods before falling asleep, resting, and 
before waking up (Bünning & Blanke, 2005; LaBerge, 1990; Palmer, 1979; Sheils, 1978; 
Twemlow, Gabbard, & Jones, 1982). Bünning and Blank (2005) conclude that these 
studies do not point, for example, to specific EEG patterns or sleep stages that may 
reliably be associated with OBEs. Moreover, use of such drugs as marijuana, opium, 
heroin, psilocybin, and LSD have been reported to be correlated with a higher frequency 
of autoscopic experiences such as OBEs (Aizenberg & Modai, 1985; Blackmore, 1982; 
Bünning & Blanke, 2005; Leary & Weil, 1968; Leary, Litwin, & Metzner, 1963; 
Shermer, 1998). For example, marijuana usage seems to increase the frequency of OBEs, 
but the data seem to show that the frequency of visual illusions and hallucinations is 
greater. With respect to general anesthesia, some evidence suggests that visual awareness 
is rare during such anesthesia, but many such visual perceptions are, in fact, OBEs or 
similar experiences (Bünning & Blanke, 2005). Such hypothesized precipitating factors 
have included sensations of paralysis, the supine position, and hemodynamic instabilities 
associated with such anesthesia. In general, OBEs seem connected to impairments of 
consciousness, supine body position, and disturbances in body processing. These 
associations seem consistent with OBEs being observed in patients with epilepsy, 
migraines, and electrical cortical stimulation. 
The above findings provide evidence that OBEs are related to states of partially 
impaired consciousness such as in sleep, dreaming, some types of seizures, migraines, 
and under general anesthesia. Bünning and Blanke (2005) use such clinical data as well 
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as review of neuroimaging findings to conclude that OBEs might likely be the result of 
functional disintegration in lower-level multisensory processing along with impaired 
body processing at the level of the brain’s temporoparietal junction (TPJ). For example, 
Smith and Messier (2014) present the results of a single-case study which explored 
functional brain imaging patterns in a subject reporting a voluntary OBE. Here, 
activations were mainly left-sided and involved the left supplementary motor area and 
supramarginal and posterior superior temporal gyri, the last two overlapping with the 
TPJ, which has been most often associated with OBEs (Smith & Messier, 2014). In more 
detail, the aforementioned multisensory processing includes vestibular, proprioceptive, 
tactile, and visual information. In addition, the TPJ is the typical lesion area for patients 
with a visual-spatial disorder with impaired spatial relationships and perspective (Farrell 
& Robertson, 2000). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that interference with the TPJ 
by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) impairs the sense of one’s own body in 
healthy volunteers, whereas no such effects are observed in imagined changes in external 
objects. Such results suggest that the TPJ is a crucial region for the experience of the self 
which mediates the sense of unity between self and body (Blanke et al., 2005). Impaired 
processing at the TPJ may lead to distortions in spatial sense of self such as in OBEs. 
Again, as in such areas as phantom limbs and delusions, review of the data points to an 
interaction of lower-level multisensory processing with higher-level processing such as 
egocentric visual-spatial perspective and location of self. In other words, multisensory 
breakdowns at the level of the TPJ may lead to such phenomena as illusory self-location, 
perspective, and agency that are experienced as an OBE (Blanke & Arzy, 2005). 
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Depersonalization: Similar to OBEs, a type of disorder called depersonalization (DPD) 
involves a sense of detachment from one’s own being, emotions, and to some degree 
reality. Furthermore, those afflicted with DPD demonstrate emotional and cognitive 
deficits. Some have argued that from an evolutionary standpoint, diminishing emotional 
responses, at times, may be helpful in adapting to intense anxiety (Stein & Simeon, 
2009). In addition to being seen in those suffering from the disorder, transient DPD 
symptoms are not uncommon in the normal population. Paths likely to mediate cognitive 
and emotional impairments in DPD have been hypothesized to include prefrontal and 
limbic regions involved in emotional-cognitive regulation. fMRI studies of DPD have 
shown decreases in activity in areas involved in affective regulation such as in the 
amygdala (Lemche et al., 2008; Lemche et al., 2007; Medford, Brierley, Brammer, 
Bullmore, David, & Phillips, 2006; Phillips et al., 2001; Stein & Simeon, 2009). What’s 
more, disruptions of prefrontal-limbic interactions occur in other disorders where 
dissociation is a symptom, such as in posttraumatic stress disorders. 
 The exact way in which these neurocircuits lead to DPD symptoms is not 
completely known, but there is substantial evidence for the role of such neurotransmitters 
as serotonin, glutamate, and opioids (Simeon, 2004; Stein & Simeon, 2009). DPD 
symptoms are often seen in withdrawal from serotonin reuptake inhibitor medications 
(SSRI’s) (Rusconi et al., 2009; Stein & Simeon, 2009). Studies also show that 
cannabinoids block N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors and have been associated 
with symptoms of DPD (Mathew et al., 1999; Medford et al., 2003; Stein & Simeon, 
2009). Finally, DPD often is accompanied by blunting of the autonomic system, mediated 
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by the noradrenergic system and parts of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal system 
(Stein & Simeon, 2009). Genetic factors related to DPD have not been well studied. In 
terms of environmental influences, some studies show that a combination of emotional 
and sexual abuse is the best predictor of general dissociation scores, a chief component of 
DPD (Simeon, Guralnik, Schmeidler, Sirof, & Knutelska, 2001; Stein & Simeon, 2009). 
Perhaps DPD is mediated by circuitry and neurotransmitters that relate to the integration 
of sensory processing, emotions, sense of self. 
 
Near-Death Experience: A particular type of dissociative mental state called near-death 
experience (NDE) was popularized in the past by some as evidence of life after death. 
Typically NDEs occur during health crises and may include seeing “spirits,” a sense that 
one is actually dead, and/or emotions of peace and tranquility (Jansen, 1990). There may 
also be a sense of separation from the body as in OBEs and hallucinations. NDEs have 
reportedly occurred in at least 35% of Americans who have a near death crisis (Jansen, 
1990). These experiences can be important, too, as they often encourage positive life 
changes. Explanations of these phenomena have included both psychological and 
physiological factors. In particular, depersonalization may be adaptive, as it alerts one to 
the threat of death and allows one to adjust to overwhelming anxiety (Greyson, 1983; 
Jansen, 1990; Noyes & Kletti, 1976a; Noyes & Kletti, 1976b). Another psychological 
explanation relies on the state-dependent reactivation of birth memories (Becker, 1982; 
Jansen, 1990). An often-cited physiological explanation for NDEs relates to the release of 
centrally active peptides as endorphins which may give rise to peak experiences such as 
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seen in women giving birth (Jansen, 1990). Others have argued for explanations related 
to the effects of hypercarbia. Specifically, a carbon dioxide-enriched mixture can 
reportedly lead to classic NDE symptoms, including detachment from the body and 
perception of a bright light. In addition, NDEs seem to be similar in those with very 
different personalities, suggesting that these type of hallucinations come from a common 
brain pathway (Jansen, 1990; Stevenson & Greyson, 1979). This bolsters the argument 
for a common neural substrate underlying NDEs. 
 Interestingly, ketamine, a short-acting anesthetic, has been demonstrated to mimic 
every feature of the NDE, from the sense of being dead to seeing mystical spirits and 
trips through dark tunnels (Jansen, 1990; Siegel, 1980). In fact, the sense of participation 
in another reality is often stronger with ketamine than with LSD. A sensory deprivation 
theory was proposed suggesting that the perceived white light in many NDEs results from 
central nervous system stimulation mimicking light on the retina and a “lowering of the 
phosphene perceptual threshold” (Jansen, 1990; Siegel, 1981). Ketamine in particular 
prevents long term potentiation, a change in status of the neurons implicated in memory 
formation and retrieval (Jansen, 1990; Maragos, Greenamyre, Penney, & Young, 1987). 
So these observations seem to point to a neural substrate for the “gate” of the sensory 
deprivation theory, that is, it may close the gate to input from the outside allowing for 
older memories to be experienced instead. Notably, ketamine acts blocks N-methyl-D-
aspartate (NMDA) linked phencyclidine (PCP) receptors. In addition, endopsychosins 
have been detected for these receptors, which suggests that they may play a role in 
protecting neurons from damage. The NDE is believed to be an important side effect of 
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consciousness and often has positive psychological consequences (Jansen, 1990). 
Acquiring new knowledge about the role of these receptors and such substances as 
ketamine and how they change brain function may also enhance our understanding of 
such disorders as dementia, schizophrenia, and drug abuse. 
 
Altered Consciousness and High Altitude: Finally, other kinds of mystical experiences 
involving altered consciousness in various ways, have occurred at high altitudes on 
mountains. In fact, such mountaintop experiences and associated “revelations” have 
reportedly been experienced by the founders of the three major religions, Moses, Jesus, 
and Mohammad (Arzy, Idel, Landis, & Blanke, 2005). These experiences seem to share 
many phenomenological aspects in common with those reported by modern mountain 
climbers. Mountaineers have reported experiences of feeling and hearing a presence, 
visual hallucinations, and changes in body perception. There seems to be substantial 
evidence suggesting that exposure to altitude affects neural and functional pathways and, 
thus, facilitates mystical and similar experiences. For example, it is well known that 
altitude mountain sickness and associated hypoxia affect the temporoparietal junction as 
well as the prefrontal cortex. Both of these areas have been linked to mystical 
experiences and altered perceptions of the body (Arzy et al., 2005). Prolonged exposure 
at sufficiently high altitudes, especially when socially deprived, may also lead to 
prefrontal lobe dysfunctions such as lowered stress tolerance and loss of inhibition (Arzy 
et al., 2005; Brugger, Regard, Landis, & Oelz, 1999). Moderate altitudes may also affect 
individuals prone to mystical experiences or changes in body perception and trigger such 
 20 
altered states. Moreover, mental imagery of heights has been associated with vestibular 
impairments and anxiety (Arzy et al., 2005). All of these findings suggest that at least 
some mystical experiences might be associated with interference with neural mechanisms 
underlying bodily perception along with cortical functions at the level of the TPJ and the 
prefrontal cortex. It seems that such altered states of consciousness associated with 
altitude may produce some positive and adaptive psychological consequences, but under 
some circumstances, may simply lead to impaired functioning related to cortical and 
prefrontal insults. 
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III. DELUSIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON THE EFFECTS OF PSYCHEDELIC 
DRUGS 
Delusions refer to the false, nonveridical beliefs that are both often associated 
with psychedelic drugs and can produce symptoms of distress and dysfunction in those 
with mental disorders. Often they are maladaptive. However, delusions have also been 
conceptualized as heterogeneous and manifesting in positive feelings or mood, 
perceptions, and thoughts (Patru & Reser, 2015). Although a primary symptom of 
psychosis, some degrees of delusional ideation are found in the normal population. Often 
delusions are quite tenacious and suffered by those with a variety of ailments ranging 
from schizophrenia to those with traumatic brain injuries, Parkinson’s disease, and 
certain neuroautoimmune disorders, as well as after the ingestion of psychogenic drugs 
(Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2007; Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009; Corlett, Taylor, 
Wang, Fletcher, & Krystal, 2010; Hudson et al., 2008; Ravina et al., 2007). It has been 
argued that delusions cannot be completely explained in terms of neurophysiological 
mechanisms (Patru & Reser, 2015). However, advances in research technologies and 
processes have allowed us to better account for delusions in terms of both brain function 
and cognition. One of the hallmarks of delusion is the presence of prediction errors, that 
is the discrepancies between expectation and experience. In this regard, a number of 
researchers suggest that delusions result from deviations in how the brain both specifies 
hierarchical predictions as well as how it computes and responds to errors in prediction 
(Corlett et al., 2010). As a result, those suffering are affected and often impaired in such 
areas as perception, memory, social learning, and obviously judgment. 
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Neurophysiology of Delusions: Various theories attempt to explain the neural 
mechanisms underlying delusions. One speculates that the claustrum, a relatively deep 
gray matter forebrain nucleus structure, may be a crucial link in the chain of events 
leading to delusional states. There have been widespread reports suggesting that both 
structural and functional changes in the claustrum represent a significant component of 
delusions (Patru & Reser, 2015). However, causality has been difficult to support due to 
challenges in studying this brain region in isolation. 
 A prominent, evidence-based theory of delusions will be reviewed in greater 
detail. It focuses on aberrant neural learning and implicates the role of dopamine 
signaling as a result of dysfunction in glutamatergic and GABAergic signaling. This 
dysregulation is thought to lead to impaired signaling of prediction error (Corlett et al., 
2010; Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007a; Grace, 1991; Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Hemsley, 
& Smith, 1991). Such disruption seems to lead to altered learning and belief formation. 
Evidence for this process comes from aberrant mesocorticolimbic prediction error signals 
recorded during causal learning using neuroimaging in people with schizophrenia (Corlett 
et al., 2010; Corlett et al., 2007b). In fact, the magnitude of these signal aberrations was 
associated with the severity of delusions. As with phantom limbs, theories attempting to 
explain delusions rely on multiple neural mechanisms at various levels of the central 
nervous system. Specifically, evidence seems to point to the computation of the mid-
brain ventral tegmental area (VTA) prediction error signals that involve the interplay 
between the basal ganglia and the prefrontal cortex (Corlett et al., 2010; Soltani & Wang, 
2010). Other studies have pointed to involvement of the hippocampus. Psychotic patients 
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have been found to have increased regional cerebral blood flow, an indirect measure of 
particular kinds of neural activity; those in whom this effect is most severe exhibit the 
most pronounced delusions (Corlett et al., 2010; Schobel et al, 2009). 
 Corlett et al. (2010) further argue that once delusions are formed, future 
prediction errors involve a reconsolidation and strengthening of the delusion. The idea is 
that, similar to overtraining, each time a delusion is activated, it is reinforced and 
becomes more resistant to contradictory evidence. So challenging an individual's 
delusions may actually strengthen them per such reinforcement. In neurophysiological 
terms, delusions may be maintained despite being false through disruptions in 
frontostriatal synaptic metaplasticity, which allows for previous associations to be 
overridden by new ones. In short, this model suggests that mismatches between 
expectancy and experience produce prediction errors which promote new and aberrant 
learning. When normal perceptual and cognitive learning about the environment is 
disrupted, then misrepresentations and delusions of reality may result. 
 
Primary Process States: Often delusions comprise and may be construed as a subset of 
characteristics of what is referred to as a more primitive or “primary state consciousness.” 
This term is differentiated from consciousness in normal, waking individuals, referred to 
as secondary consciousness. Psychotic states, states induced by psychedelic drugs, REM 
sleep, and temporal lobe epilepsy provide illustrations of the former type of cognition that 
is qualitatively different from that seen in normal waking consciousness. It has been 
suggested that the brain undergoes a phase transition from normal waking to the primary 
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process state (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014). In any case, one of the prominent theories of 
primary state consciousness relies on the construct of entropy and incorporates principles 
of psychology, physics, and neurophysiology. In this context, entropy is used to measure 
uncertainty about a system, where high entropy implies high disorder. Based in part on 
neuroimaging data, Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) propose that entropy is suppressed in 
normal waking consciousness, and this constraining quality allows for normal cognitive 
functions such as reality-testing and self-awareness to occur. In contrast, one of the 
hallmarks of primary process consciousness is increased disorder or entropy. Entry into 
the primary process state is claimed to rely on a collapse of the normally-organized 
activity within the default-mode network of the brain (DMN). During goal-directed 
cognition, this network of connected brain regions is relatively deactivated. In addition, it 
is claimed that in the primary process state, there is a decoupling between the DMN and 
the medial temporal lobes, areas that are normally linked. 
 Furthermore, it is suggested that primary states exhibit “criticality,” a property of 
being placed at a critical point in the transition zone between order and disorder and 
which, therefore, gives rise to certain phenomena such as delusions (Carhart-Harris et al., 
2014). Self-organized criticality describes how a complex system displays certain 
properties once it reaches a critical point between the extremes of system order and 
chaos. So again, as with neurophysiological theories of delusion, hypotheses attempting 
to explain the broader concept of primary states rely on interaction among various brain 
regions along a continuum, which seems to parallel the spectrum of behavior from 
healthy to grossly psychotic. 
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Psychedelic Drugs: The conception of the “entropic brain” was, in part, based on 
neuroimaging data specifically with psilocybin, a classic psychedelic drug. As a 
background, it should be noted that all classic psychedelic drugs are agonists at one of the 
serotonin 5-HT2A receptor sites. The evidence suggests a strong correlation between a 
psychedelic’s affinity for the site and its psychedelic potency. The distribution of this 
receptor is highest in high-level association regions and lowest in the motor cortex areas 
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; Erritzoe et al., 2009), which may explain why psychedelics 
influence cognition and perception much more than motor activity. A series of studies 
used functional MRI and MEG techniques to assess neural changes in subjects injected 
with psilocybin. These studies provided some basic clues about the mechanisms by which 
psychedelics alter consciousness and how changes in brain functions are associated with 
primary consciousness states. In particular, it was found that after injection of the 
psychedelic, one of the outcomes was decreased connectivity in brain regions that are 
normally functionally connected and organized in their activity (Carhart-Harris et al., 
2014). This seems to provide evidence for the general idea that psychedelics alter 
consciousness by increasing entropy, or in other words, by disorganizing brain activity. 
 It should be noted that some researchers argue with the conception that entropy is 
a unique indicator of the quality of consciousness and that there is a contradiction 
between suggesting that primary consciousness is regressive and suboptimal but, at the 
same time, exhibits more “criticality” than normal states (Papo, 2016). Papo further 
argues that during the psychedelic state, the number of “negative” connectivity patterns 
may decrease, but some of these patterns may be functionally detrimental. In addition, 
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some studies suggest that under some circumstances, criticality may be optimal in terms 
of storage of information, large network stability, and sensitivity to sensory stimuli. So 
Papo then asks how the brain can be critical and suboptimal at the same time. 
Although there is disagreement on the interpretation of primary consciousness 
data such as with the constructs of entropy and criticality, there seems to be some 
consensus based in part on more recent neuroimaging studies to indicate that 
psychedelics modulate information processing in both cortical and subcortical emotion 
and memory brain circuits (Kraehenmann et al., 2017). Some of these brain areas include 
the cingulate cortex, temporal cortex, insula, amygdala, and hippocampus. These 
observations also receive support from recent receptor binding studies showing 
widespread expressions of 5-HT2A/5-HT1A receptors in both subcortical and cortical 
regions of the brain (Beliveau et al., 2017; Kraehenmann et al., 2017). Since as 
previously cited, psychedelic drugs are agonists at these sites, it is easy to understand 
why these drugs often induce intense emotional arousal and distorted cognitions. In 
particular, it has been shown that 5-HT2A receptor activation is a primary mechanism for 
psychedelic-induced imagery, positive mood states (Kometer et al., 2012; Kraehenmann 
et al., 2017), and body image changes (Kraehenmann et al., 2017; Vollenweider, 
Vollenweider-Scherpenhuyzen, Bäbler, Vogel, & Hell, 1998). 
In addition to the previously-referenced psilocybin effects, lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD) has also been shown to increase primary process thinking, again a 
more primitive and more associative/automatic cognitive mode often occurring during 
altered states of consciousness. A now classic study using a double-blind, placebo-
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controlled experimental design provided strong evidence that LSD induces primary 
process thinking. In addition, these effects seem related to both subjective drug 
experience and activation of 2A receptor sites (Kraehenmann et al., 2017). In more detail, 
the chief conclusion of the study was that LSD increases primary process thinking, 
particularly image fusion, sudden shifts of images, contradictory feelings, loosening of 
memory, and illogical, delusional thoughts. In comparison with the placebo, LSD 
increased the “primary index,” a measure of primary process thinking in the reports of 
imagery and thoughts. The effects of LSD on the primary index was extinguished by 
ketanserin, a 5-HT2A receptor antagonist, again evidencing this receptor as a central 
mediator of drug-induced imagery. This data also seems consistent with the previously-
discussed entropic brain theory which posits that psychedelics induce an “unconstrained” 
and “high-entropy,” more disordered cognitive state. 
However, contrary to such cognitive shift models which suggest psychedelic 
drugs decrease secondary process thinking, data from the LSD study did not demonstrate 
significant effects of LSD on secondary process patterns, only a sizable increase in 
primary process ones. The LSD study seemed to suggest that there is no simple transition 
from secondary toward primary process thinking, but that both may coexist even when 
primary process predominates. Like with other mental processes, primary and secondary 
processes seem best viewed on a continuum, rather than construed as all or none. In fact, 
there is evidence for close “neurophenomenological” similarities between psychedelic 
and lucid dreaming experiences. The researchers also posit that 5-HT2A receptor 
activation by psychedelics triggers dreamlike imagery related to primary process thinking 
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along with changes in the sense of self and body distortion. This was supported by the 
finding that LSD-induced primary process thinking was correlated with the drug-induced 
measure of cognitive bizarreness known to be associated with dreaming cognition 
(Kraehenmann et al., 2017). This connection between drug-induced effects and dreaming 
has also been supported by neuroimaging studies which found that both psychedelic 
drugs and REM dreams activate temporal lobe regions, leading again to visual imagery 
and changes in body image (Kraehenmann et al., 2017; Maquet et al, 1996). 
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IV. AUTONOMIC REFLEXES INCLUDING BREATHING AND HEARTBEAT 
 
Respiratory Influences: There is considerable evidence linking the effects of fear and 
anxiety on autonomic responses including respiratory ones. For example, there is clearly 
a strong positive association between respiratory frequencies and responses to anxiety, 
both measured by self-report inventories and neuroimaging studies (Homma & Masaoka, 
2008). Conversely, few studies have assessed the effects of respiratory dynamics on 
cognitive functioning. But it seems that respiration has indeed been demonstrated to 
influence brain activity, including both perceptual and cognitive functions. Heck et al. 
(2017) et al. argue that respiration specifically contributes a component of rhythm to 
cortical activity. This rhythmic activity then connects breathing with higher-level cortical 
regions that underlie cognitive functions. In particular, it is posited that such rhythmic 
input from respiration influences cortical neurons to activate rhythmically at the same 
frequency (Heck et al., 2017). These researchers generalize that, via different sensory 
pathways, respiration provides a continuous “modulation” of such cortical activity and 
affects both sensory as well as emotional and cognitive functioning (Heck et al., 2017). 
Specifically, evidence is cited that increases in cortical activity in a certain frequency 
range, namely gamma, occur more often during specific phases of the respiratory cycle. It 
is these gamma oscillations in the cortex that have been associated with higher-level, 
cognitive functioning. Some of these functions have included attention, decision-making, 
problem solving, and memory and language processing (Crone et al., 2001; Fries, 
Reynolds, Rorie, & Desimone, 2001; Heck et al., 2017; Kay & Beshel, 2010; Laufs et al., 
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2003; Marshall, Helgadóttir, Mölle, & Born, 2006; Sheth, Sandkühler, & Bhattacharya, 
2009; Siegel, Engel, & Donner, 2011; Tallon-Baudry, 2004). 
 With regard to cognitive performance, one interesting line of research has focused 
on the effects of unilateral forced nostril breathing on cognitive and perceptual 
performance capabilities. For example, one study described the effects of such unilateral 
nostril breathing on both verbal and spatial skills (Jella & Shannahoff-Khalsa, 1993). The 
researchers hypothesized that left nostril breathing would increase neural activity in the 
right hemisphere and that right nostril breathing would enhance neural activity in the left 
hemisphere, leading to differential improvements in spatial versus verbal performance, 
respectively, consistent with some previous EEG findings. The results provided some 
support for the hypothesis that left nostril breathing increases spatial performance, but 
there was little evidence that right nostril breathing significantly increases verbal 
performance. 
 So beyond providing for the necessary exchange of gases, it seems that respiration 
can provide a link between somatic and mental states. In fact, there is a body of evidence 
related to the effects of yoga and military breathing exercises that shows how consciously 
controlling respiration may influence cognitive and emotional states (Brown & Gerbarg, 
2005; Heck et al., 2017; Jella & Shannahoff-Khalsa, 1993; Stančák & Kuna, 1994). In 
particular, one study demonstrated the emotional regulatory components of mindfulness 
as seeming to rely, at least in part, on controlled breathing. Here, a focused breathing 
induction led to improved emotional reactivity and less negative response to neutral 
slides. These results were consistent with previous work supporting the emotional 
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benefits of mindfulness, whereby some speculate that such training is associated with 
greater left-sided anterior brain activation (Arch & Craske, 2006). Others have suggested 
that the calming effects of slow, deep breathing could be largely attributable to this 
respiration-phased influence across areas of the cortex. During meditative states, such 
relaxed EEG activity has been observed (Heck et al., 2017). Of course, in these studies, in 
order to isolate the emotional benefits of respiratory effects themselves, one needs to 
separate those respiratory effects from the known benefits of relaxation in general. For 
example, the results of one study showed mean skin conductance levels reflecting a 
decrease in sympathetic activity during the relaxation but not during the attentive part of 
a deep and slow breathing induction (Busch et al., 2012). Here both parts of the breathing 
intervention were shown to be associated with reductions in negative feelings such as 
anger and tension. 
 Similar to such reported sympathetic activity and related emotional effects, there 
is a body of literature linking respiratory cycles to subjective pain sensations. As 
breathing is fundamental to relaxation and meditation, the control of respiration is also 
used as a means to regulate pain. For instance, one of the first studies in this area 
demonstrated that pain and pain-related brain activity can be reduced during the 
inspiration phase of breathing, although the effects were quite modest (Arsenault, 
Ladouceur, Lehmann, Rainville, & Piché, 2013). In this study, the respiratory effects on 
pain and pain-related cerebral activity were explained, in part, by positing a transient 
increase in blood pressure during inspiration which then activates descending inhibiting 
pathways leading to reduced neural activity in the brain. The effects were also explained 
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by the possible effects of distraction from the inspiration. However, given the small size 
of the effects, it was assumed that reported analgesic effects of meditation were 
attributable, to a large extent, to other factors. 
 Other studies have focused on analgesic effects related to breathing expiration. In 
this regard, some researchers have suggested that slow breathing increases activation of 
bronchopulmonary afferents as well as heart rate variability, leading to higher 
parasympathetic tone that counteracts the sympathetic activation associated with pain 
(Iwabe, Ozaki, & Hashizume, 2014). Another study on meditation led to an alternative 
“top-down” explanation for pain reduction from slow breathing. In particular, fMRI 
imaging of the study’s subjects showed that meditation was associated with alteration of 
activity in the executive-level cortical regions such as the anterior cingulate cortex and 
orbitofrontal cortex. This type of cortical activity is thought to be associated with 
deactivation of the thalamus and diminished pain (Iwabe, Ozaki, & Hashizume, 2014; 
Zeidan et al., 2011). 
 Finally, it should be noted that rhythmic activity arising from respiration is 
produced both consciously and unconsciously. For example, conscious sensory input 
includes normal sensations of air flowing through such airways as the mouth and nose. 
Unconscious signals might include ones from the lungs and other internal organs. More 
subtle and indirect channels for such respiration-based sensory input include eye 
movements which change during sleep and wakefulness. In addition, brain stem neurons 
that connect to the thalamus seem to allow for respiratory rhythmic influence to reach the 
thalamus (Heck et al., 2017). 
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Cardiac Effects: As seen with respiration, internal physiological states seem to be able to 
influence cognitive and emotional ones. In addition to respiratory effects, there is 
considerable evidence depicting the association between the neural processing of internal 
bodily states (interoception) such as heart rhythms and perceptual and affective 
experiences. For example, one study showed an association between such cardiac 
rhythms and demonstrations of empathy. In this study, heartbeat evoked potential (HEP), 
a surface EEG pattern thought to reflect cortical processing of cardiac afferent input, 
along with other metrics such as heart rate were measured. Significant HEP differences 
were found among groups showing differential levels of empathy as measured by self-
report instruments (Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011). Other studies including 
those using fMRI have shown less reported awareness, i.e., suppression of visual stimuli 
at the same frequency as the heartbeat versus those presented at different frequencies 
(Salomon et al., 2018). In terms of underlying neuropsychological mechanisms, Salomon 
et al. (2018) provide evidence for the critical role played by the anterior insular cortex in 
integrating cardiac and visual data that impacts visual awareness. For example, these 
researchers found that a patient with unilateral damage in the right anterior insula did not 
show the above-referenced suppression effect, whereas control patients with damage in 
other cortical areas did show the suppression effect. So these findings were cited as 
evidence that not just sensory processing, but processing around the integration of 
interoceptive and external signals is also mediated by the anterior insular. The authors 
acknowledge that these findings need to be corroborated given only one patient with 
anterior insular cortex damage was examined and that the overall sample size of the study 
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also was small. Since lesions to the anterior insular cortex are also known to impact 
emotional functioning, it was suggested that this area of the cortex likely also mediates 
interoceptive influences on perception and emotion. 
 Similar cortical heartbeat-evoked activity has been found to influence visual 
experiences and associated body image perceptions (Ronchi et al., 2017; Winston & 
Rees, 2014). In particular, such heartbeat-evoked brain activity seems to affect the ability 
to accurately describe the presence or absence of a visual target. Heartbeat-evoked neural 
activity specifically has been found and is tracked in significant areas of the cortex 
including the right inferior parietal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex (Park, Correia, 
Ducorps, & Tallon-Baudry, 2014; Winston & Rees, 2014). Other recent research has 
demonstrated that such interoceptive and especially cardiac signals can influence 
cognitive, emotional, perceptual, and processing related to the sense of self (Allen et al., 
2016; Aspell et al., 2013; Babo-Rebelo, Richter, & Tallon-Baudry, 2016; Craig, 2009; 
Craig, 2010; Garfinkel et al., 2014; Gray, Rylander, Harrison, Wallin, & Critchley, 2009; 
Park & Tallon-Baudry, 2014; Park et al., 2016; Sandman, McCanne, Kaiser, & Diamond, 
1977; Salomon et al., 2018; Sel, Azevedo, & Tsakiris, 2017; Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, 
& Seth, 2013). Such interoceptive input such as the heartbeat may, in fact, provide 
sensory input that helps to shape the image of the self and sense of self-consciousness 
(Salomon et al., 2018). Further evidence comes from a study exploring the impact of 
cardiac signals on neural processing of body images (Ronchi et al., 2017) that sought to 
elucidate the underlying neurophysiological brain mechanisms of such processing. These 
researchers recorded EEG and reviewed visual evoked potentials during the presentation 
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of body images with the subjects' heartbeat, both synchronized and not. This study 
revealed distinct periods and patterns of cortical activation that reflected the heartbeat 
signals and their influence on the visual processing of bodies. For example, there was 
evidence for increased visual processing when a full body was shown rather than a 
scrambled one but only when in synchrony with the heartbeat of the subject (Ronchi et 
al., 2017). 
 Related to body perception, there also exists evidence of altered bodily awareness 
associated with changes in heartbeat evoked potentials in subjects with impaired 
mental/emotional states. Specifically, one study demonstrated that compared to controls, 
depressed individuals demonstrated less accurate heartbeat perceptions and altered bodily 
awareness (Terhaar, Viola, Bär, & Debener, 2012). In addition, decreased heartbeat 
perception in the depressed group manifested in reduced heartbeat-evoked potentials as 
measured by their EEG amplitudes. Fortunately, it seems that awareness of heartbeats 
including heartbeat-evoked potentials can be improved with training (Schandry & 
Weitkunat, 1990; Terhaar et al., 2012). It has been speculated that enhancing the 
awareness of bodily signals such as cardiac ones might improve body image and benefit 
depressed patients. At the least, there seems to be increasing interest in the role of cardiac 
and other interoceptive information in visual processing and the link to one’s perception 
of self and consciousness. A very exciting prospect is that insight into the neural 
correlates of emotion regulation in general and body self-consciousness in particular and 
how both may be altered by cardiac and other sensory stimuli seems to offer potential for 
the treatment of those with depression and body image disorders. 
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V. VIRTUAL REALITY 
Virtual reality (VR) allows users to be transported into a kind of virtual world. To 
achieve these effects, a combination of technologies is used such as head-mounted 
displays and tracking systems, headphones with music/other sounds, and sticks and other 
assistive equipment for navigating in the virtual world. Sometimes multimodal stimuli 
including visual, tactile, and olfactory ones are utilized to create an experience of 
immersion in the virtual world. Here, the components of the VR system work together to 
produce sensory illusions that simulate reality. In other words, the objective is to 
facilitate brain and behavioral responses in the virtual world that are analogous to those in 
reality (Bohil, Alicea, & Biocca, 2011). In the past, VR was used primarily for recreation 
and entertainment. In recent years, VR technology has increasingly been applied to 
medical areas of pain management and treatment of psychiatric disorders (Li, Montaño, 
Chen, & Gold, 2011). In addition, there have been attempts to understand the underlying 
biological mechanisms related to VR-specific experiences. 
 
Strengths of Research Using VR: VR makes important contributions to research. When 
applied in psychology and neuroscience research, VR technology provides the advantage 
of dynamic and realistic settings along with a high degree of control over independent 
variables examined. For example, VR allows for natural, interactive behavior to be 
assessed while brain activity is being monitored through recordings and imaging. VR also 
allows for a great deal of control over multisensory stimulation as well as motor activity 
(Bohil et al., 2011). In many neuroscience research settings, multisensory stimulation and 
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embodied interaction are difficult to otherwise obtain. For example, with regard to the 
employment of VR in combination with recording brain activity, recording from neurons 
in such areas as the frontal lobe has revealed brain place-cell activity specifically related 
to navigation. Moreover, studies on sex differences have been supported by combining 
VR with fMRI. Here, there is evidence in men of increased activation of the posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex while navigating in a virtual environment (Bohil et al., 
2011). In women, relatively more activity has been found in the parahippocampal gyrus, 
an area associated with the ability to remember landmarks. These findings are consistent 
with indications that women make more use of landmarks than men when navigating. 
 With respect to research in social neuroscience, VR studies have helped identify 
parts of the brain involved in interpreting face and eye movements of others (Bohil et al., 
2011; Slater, Usoh, & Steed, 1995). Subjects approached by an angry virtual character 
displayed increased activation of the superior temporal sulcus along with the lateral 
fusiform gyrus. Similar research offers potential for understanding some of the deficits in 
autistic spectrum disorders (Bohil et al., 2011; Pelphrey & Carter, 2008). For example, in 
children with autism, no significant differences were found in activation of the right 
posterior sulcus in response to a virtual other shifting gaze in an unexpected direction, in 
contrast with normal controls. Such findings underscore the importance of the posterior 
sulcus for interpreting the intentions of others. Finally, the technique of hyperscanning 
allows researchers to assess the reactions of multiple subjects to shared social situations 
in a virtual reality environment (Bohil et al., 2011). 
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VR and Embodiment Issues: “Presence research” focuses on the degree to which VR 
subjects actually perceive that and behave as if they are in virtually constructed worlds. It 
has been argued that presence is a phenomenon worthy of study by neuroscientists, as it 
can assist in the exploration of consciousness. VR might be regarded as consciousness 
within a restricted domain (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2004), and the technology supports 
the creation of “magical” scenarios in such cases as the dissociation of sensory modalities 
from one another. Being able to produce such dissociation allows for the study of 
underlying brain mechanisms that are associated with such sensory experiences. 
 As discussed in previous sections, body representation seems malleable and prone 
to manipulation toward self-image distortion. In one study that used conflicting visual-
somatosensory input in virtual reality, the spatial unity between the self and the body was 
disrupted. In particular, the subjects seemed to experience the virtual body seen in front 
of them as their own (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). The authors 
concluded that body self-consciousness and its spatial unity are based on both 
multisensory data and cognitive processing. In another study, VR was used to assess the 
effects of manipulating multisensory feedback and virtual perspective on the perception 
of embodying a virtual body that was exposed to threat (Debarba et al., 2017). In this 
context, embodying implies a sense of having and being in control of the body. The 
results provided evidence that illusory ownership of a virtual body can occur in both first 
and third person perspectives under certain visual-motor-tactile conditions. There was a 
stronger sense of body ownership and reaction to threat for the first person perspective 
than for the third person one. Other studies support the notion that altering the normal 
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association between touch and its visual correlates can produce the illusory perception of 
a fake limb in one’s own body. For instance, when touch is seen to be applied to a rubber 
hand while felt simultaneously on a hidden actual hand, an illusion of ownership of the 
rubber hand typically happens. This paradigm has also been utilized to demonstrate body 
substitution illusions. In these studies, VR technology allowed the researchers to use 
novel experimental designs. In another study, a first person perspective of a virtual 
human woman that seemed to substitute the male subjects’ own bodies was sufficient to 
produce an illusion of body transfer, as demonstrated in response to a threat to the virtual 
body (Slater, Spanlang, Bernhard, Sanchez-Vives, & Blanke, 2010). 
 All these findings support the idea that lower-level perceptual mechanisms seem 
to be able to at least temporarily override top-down knowledge and produce a dramatic 
illusion of transfer of body ownership. In addition to manipulating embodiment through 
stimulation of a subject’s hand, embodiment seems to be influenced by directly activating 
the brain’s hand representation. In one study, researchers combined TMS to activate the 
corticospinal representation of the hand with virtual reality to allow matching, mimicking 
involuntary hand movements evoked by the TMS (Bassolino et al., 2018). It was 
demonstrated that illusory embodiment occurred when TMS pulses were matched with 
VR feedback, but not when TMS was given outside the primary motor cortex. The 
researchers concluded that non-invasive brain stimulation can replace the use of tactile 
cues and motor components related to anticipation and planning. 
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Therapeutic Applications of VR: In addition to being utilized in neuroscience research, 
VR has shown effectiveness in therapeutic applications. Two areas of significance have 
included treatment of psychiatric disorders and pain management. Regarding the former, 
one of the most widely investigated uses of VR has been in the area of treatment of 
phobias. For example, often phobias are treated by gradual exposure to the feared object. 
In this regard, a virtual setting offers the therapist a chance to adjust the degree of 
exposure and reach a high level of consistency over time (Bohil et al., 2011). Such 
simulations can provide for greater generalization to real-world settings than use of 
mental imagery alone. 
 
VR and Pain Management: The use of VR in pain management will be explored in 
greater detail, not only because it has practical, therapeutic implications, but also because 
it has allowed researchers to gain a better understanding of the neural mechanisms 
underlying pain. VR has been shown to reduce pain, and the effect has been called VR 
analgesia. Self-report pain ratings have been supported with fMRI data showing reduced 
brain activity in regions known to be activated by thermal pain stimulation (Li et al., 
2011). Virtual settings seem to be able to change perceptual representations of one’s body 
and alter the experience of pain by shifting the one’s attention away from it (Bohil et al., 
2011; Gold, Belmont, & Thomas, 2007; Li et al., 2011; Magora, Cohen, Shochina, & 
Dayan, 2006; Mahrer & Gold, 2009; Rutter, Dahlquist, & Weiss, 2009). It is believed that 
pain relief related to VR is a function of its capacity for multimodal stimulation and 
interactivity. In VR, a variety of distraction methods can be used to reduce the subjective 
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perception of pain. In studies on pain distraction using fMRI to assess brain activity, it 
has been shown that pain modulation is more active during such distraction. In particular, 
such regions as the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the orbitofrontal 
cortex show increased activation during pain with distraction compared to during pain 
alone (Gold et al., 2007; Valet et al., 2004). Moreover, regions of the brain associated 
with pain such as the thalamus and insular cortex display decreased activation during a 
distraction task. Such observations suggest that pain distraction occurring with VR 
involves a process of inhibition of pain-modulation pathways. There is evidence that VR 
acts specifically through the ACC, in that the ACC diverts attentions away from pain and 
contributes to VR-induced analgesia. 
VR is known to greatly affect and produce pleasurable emotions by modifying 
environments and sensory stimuli. In addition to distraction, there is evidence that such 
emotional influence also has the capacity to reduce pain. It has been suggested that the 
emotional aspect of VR may attenuate pain through connections between the amygdala 
and the ACC (Gold et al., 2007). 
What’s more, research has focused on the effects of VR on the treatment of 
embodiment issues and neuropathic pain following spinal cord injury (SCI). SCI can 
have debilitating effects on the central nervous system along with producing chronic 
pain. Multisensory processing and the related sense of body ownership may also be 
impaired in SCI patients (Lenggenhager, Pazzaglia, Scivoletto, Molinari, & Aglioti, 
2012; Pozeg et al., 2017; Scandola, Aglioti, Pozeg, Avesani, & Moro, 2017). Pozeg et al. 
(2017) evaluated and attempted to intervene in patients with SCI by altering their 
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perception of body ownership and pain via combining virtual tactile and visual input. In 
this study, there were twenty patients with SCI and twenty healthy controls. Using a 
virtual leg illusion, the researchers applied visuotactile stimulation to the subject's back 
and to virtual legs as shown on a VR display. In addition, illusory leg ownership was 
compared with illusory global body ownership induced by a full body illusion. The 
results demonstrated that the patients with SCI were less sensitive to multisensory 
stimulations producing illusory leg ownership compared to control patients. In addition, 
perceived leg ownership decreased with time following the SCI. No significant 
differences were found between the groups in global body ownership, though. Under 
specific conditions, both illusions were associated with mild analgesia. Specifically 
regarding this pain reduction, though there were mild analgesic effects in the virtual leg 
illusion, only synchronous visuotactile stimulation in the back condition resulted in a 
“near significant” reduction of neuropathic pain. The researchers speculated that the 
stimulation may have temporarily interfered with the abnormally-altered leg 
representations in the patients with SCI (Pozeg et al., 2017). 
Taking into account what is known of the neurophysiology of pain reduction, it 
may be hypothesized that by taking attention away from a stressful medical setting to an 
immersive virtual setting, VR may activate the perigenual ACC, a region previously 
described as mediating attention and emotion. The perigenual ACC might then activate 
downstream targets which signal events to stimulate the pain modulation system and 
create analgesia (Gold et al., 2007). The results in the related study by Gold et al. (2007) 
are limited by both the data showing only “near significant” pain reduction and the 
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relatively small and heterogeneous group of patients with SCI. But it may be speculated 
that using more intense or more prolonged and repeated stimulation might yield greater 
effects. In any case, VR approaches seem to offer non-invasive potential for perhaps 
modest pain reduction for patients with pain as well as enhance our understanding of the 
neural correlates underlying such psychological factors as attention and emotion. 
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VI. ANTON-BABINSKI, CHARLES BONNET, AND DIOGENES SYNDROMES 
 
Anton-Babinski Syndrome: Patients with the rare Anton-Babinski syndrome suffer 
from but deny cortical blindness. Although their pupils respond to light, they do not have 
functional sight (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991). Often they deny visual deficits and create 
false stories about what they “see.” Even in the face of full evidence of their blindness, 
those with this syndrome will confabulate to fill in absent sensory data. In summary, 
Anton-Babinski syndrome is a neuropsychiatric condition with symptoms of bilateral 
cortical blindness and anosognosia with visual confabulation, but typically without 
memory deficits or dementia (Chen, Chang, Hsu, & Chen, 2015). Anterior visual tracts in 
these patients are usually intact, but bilateral damage exists to the occipital lobes. These 
patients’ false beliefs about their sight have been attributed to damage in the visual 
association cortex. Similarly, neural disconnections between visual and other brain 
regions are thought to contribute to confabulating responses (Chen et al., 2015). 
 
Anton-Babinski Syndrome Etiology and Selected Cases: Anton-Babinski syndrome 
represents one kind of cortical blindness. Some causes of the disorder are: ischemic or 
hemorrhagic stroke involving the occipital lobes, posterior leukoencephalopathy from 
chemotherapy, radiotherapy, adrenoleukodystrophy, lactic acidosis, stroke-like episodes, 
trauma-related optic neuropathy, bifrontal contusion, and callosal disconnection 
(Abutalebi et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2015; McDaniel & McDaniel, 1991). The most 
common cause is ischemic cerebrovascular disease and stroke. Early diagnosis of the 
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syndrome may allow for early antiplatelet medication treatment, which may improve 
vision or awareness of blindness (Chen et al., 2015). Chen et al. (2015) indicate that it 
can be quite difficult to make a correct diagnosis, and many assume that the condition is 
psychiatric especially in the elderly. These researchers presented a case of a 90-year-old 
man who presented with the two hallmarks of the syndrome, namely bilateral cortical 
blindness and anosognosia plus visual confabulation. During the following week, he 
gradually became aware of his blindness, but he died of pneumonia a month later. 
Although quite rare, Anton-Babinski syndrome can afflict children, as in the case of a 
described 6-year-old with early state childhood cerebral adrenoleukodystrophy (Trifiletti, 
Syed, Hayes-Rosen, Parano, & Pavone, 2007). Anton-Babinski syndrome can also be 
difficult to diagnosis in children given that the child has to be sufficiently old and 
cognitively intact to accurately report visual perceptions. At times, Anton-Babinski 
syndrome develops secondary to an initial disease, as in the case presented of a patient 
who suffered mitochondrial encephalomyopathy, lactic acidosis, and stroke-like episodes 
(MELAS), a mitochondrial disorder, that later developed into Anton-Babinski syndrome 
(Alemdar et al., 2007). 
 
Anton-Babinski Syndrome Neurophysiology: As broached earlier, theories that attempt 
to explain the lack of awareness of impairments make reference to neural disconnections. 
One theory points to a conscious awareness system (CAS) of the parietal lobes, which 
monitors information received from the senses. This system connects with others in the 
frontal lobes, which integrate the information and allow for the performance of high-level 
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cognitive tasks. Damage to association pathways between the CAS and visual cortex may 
be responsible for the lack of awareness of visual impairments (Carvajal, Cárdenas, 
Pazmiño, & Herrera, 2012). In addition, these patients may suffer from disconnection of 
the visual areas from other brain regions, such as language ones. This disconnection may 
contribute to the confabulation. Other neuropsychological mechanisms have been posited 
to account for the symptoms. One of these implicates signal transmission to the visual 
monitor, which is located in the visual association cortex, from another visual system 
located on the superior colliculus, pulvinar, and temporoparietal areas (Carvajal et al., 
2012). Like the aforementioned disconnection between visual and language regions of the 
brain, this secondary visual pathway has also been posited as contributing to 
confabulation in these blind patients. 
 
Charles Bonnet Syndrome: Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) was named after the man 
who first described and reportedly later developed the disorder. Hallmark symptoms of 
this disorder include complex and vivid visual hallucinations that are usually recognized 
as not real. Often these hallucinations are well-defined, clear, and organized, but over 
which the individual has little control. Generally, there are no other major psychiatric 
symptoms present. This syndrome has been described in terms of lesions of the visual 
system from the eye to the occipital cortex (Bhatia, Srivastava, Jhanjee, & Rathi, 2012). 
Other researchers have pointed to causes related to deafferentation of the visual 
association areas of the cerebral cortex which may lead to a kind of phantom vision 
(Menon, Rahman, Menon, & Dutton, 2003). The disorder is most common in the elderly, 
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but patients are sometimes reluctant to admit to hallucinations for fear of being labeled 
mentally ill. 
 
CBS Clinical Features and Diagnostic Criteria: The most common images in 
hallucinations are of people such as distorted faces and small, costumed figures. Other 
images have been described as subtle geometric ones and animals (Menon et al., 2003). 
Often these hallucinations fail to be associated with triggering factors but in some, they 
may be elicited by various stimuli such as fatigue, stress, and various levels of light. 
Frequency patterns of the disease may be episodic, periodic, or continuous. Quality of life 
in those with visual impairments may be greatly affected. Suggested risk factors have 
included social isolation, cerebrovascular disease, and fatigue (Menon et al., 2003). 
Diagnostic criteria suggested by Gold and Rabins (1989) include the following: visual 
hallucinations which are formed, complex, persistent, and stereotyped, some degree of 
insight present, and the absence of delusions. 
 
CBS Neurological Basis and Features: It has been suggested that CBS can occur as a 
result of pathology anywhere along the visual pathway (Dodd, Heffeman, & Blake, 1999; 
Fernandes, Scassellati-Sforzolini, & Spaide, 2000; Kölmel et al., 1985; McNamara, 
Heros, & Boller, 1982; Menon et al., 2003; Price, Whitlock, & Hall, 1983). Studies of 
cerebral perfusion during hallucinations implicate the following regions as being most 
responsible for CBS complex visual hallucinations: lateral temporal cortex, corpus 
striatum, and thalamus (Menon et al., 2003). The tendency of CBS hallucinations to 
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happen during drowsiness has led some to suggest a role for the ascending reticular 
activating system in the prevention of the hallucinations. It has also been inferred that the 
origin of the hallucinations lie in the visual association areas (Lance, 1976; Menon et al., 
2003). Likewise, the ability to recall visual images from memory in those with cortical 
blindness suggests that the primary visual area of the occipital cortex does not subserve 
visual memory (Chatterjee & Southwood, 1995; Menon et al., 2003). Neuroimaging 
studies have shown that visual hallucinations are associated with phasic activity in 
specialized areas of the visual cortex, which is reflected in the content of the 
hallucinations. Thus, activation of different cortical regions may elicit different kinds of 
hallucinatory images (Anderson & Rizzo, 1994; Holroyd & Rabins, 1996; Menon et al., 
2003; Rousseaux, Debrock, Cabaret, & Steinling, 1994). 
 
Theories of CBS Symptom Pathogenesis: Various mechanisms and theories, some 
overlapping and some emphasizing different neurological loci, have been put forth. In 
this regard, it may be argued that CBS is a disorder that shows how multiple neurological 
mechanisms can produce a single psychopathological symptom, in this case, 
hallucinations. For example, findings from some studies suggest that when elderly people 
suffer from eye disorders, subsequent excessive cortical compensation in the lateral 
temporal cortex, striatum, and thalamus may trigger visual hallucinations (Adachi, 
Watanabe, Matsuda, & Onuma, 2000). There is also evidence that the pathology of CBS 
is similar to that seen in phantom limb pain syndromes (Mewasingh, Kornreich, 
Christiaens, Christophe, & Dan, 2002). In particular, after sensory loss, sensory 
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deprivation is thought to enhance activity in the visual system which may lead to nerve 
impulses giving rise to the hallucinations. This explanation seems consistent with the 
sensorimotor gating model (Chéron, Dan, & Borenstein, 2000; Mewasingh et al., 2002) 
which posits that the inability to adequately filter or gate incoming data produces the 
hallucinations. This notion seems supported by the observation that hallucinations can be 
eliminated by normal or excessive visual stimulation. Furthermore, when sensory input 
drops below a threshold value in diseases of the eyes, the brain may then allow 
previously registered perceptions to emerge, resulting in hallucinations, a theory of 
perceptual release (Menon et al., 2003). Other researchers challenge the theory of 
perceptual release and depict a network of neurons, a neuromatrix, throughout the brain 
which can generate sensory phantoms (Menon et al., 2003; Needham & Taylor, 1992). 
 
Diogenes Syndrome: Diogenes syndrome (DS), sometimes known as senile squalor 
syndrome, is a disorder characterized by extreme lack of hygiene and self-neglect, 
apathy, and social withdrawal (Cipriani, Lucetti, Vedovello, & Nuti, 2012). Sometimes 
there is compulsive hoarding of garbage or unusual items. It has been demonstrated that 
self-neglecting older adults have an increased risk of morbidity and mortality (Cipriani et 
al., 2012; Lachs, Williams, O’Brien, Pillemer, & Charlson, 1998). Various disorders such 
as depression, dementia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and alcoholism have been 
posited as contributors to DS (Cipriani et al., 2012). The distinction has been made 
between two types of DS, primary and secondary. In the latter type, there is a clear 
connection to other mental disorders such as schizophrenia and affective disorders 
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(Cipriani et al., 2012; Reyes-Ortiz, 2001). For some especially elderly patients, new-onset 
DS may be attributable to dementia. The majority of patients showing self-neglect, for 
example, are diagnosed with dementia within a couple of years following onset of DS. It 
has long been known that dementia patients often are unable to assess what is of value 
and may hoard garbage and other objects (Cipriani et al., 2012; Weiss, 2010). 
 
DS Etiology and Neuropsychology: Decline in personal hygiene is one of the features of 
frontotemporal dementia (FTD). Typically FTD is a presenile disorder accounting for 
20% of dementias in those age 65 years or younger (Gálvez-Andres et al., 2007). 
Sometimes the initial differential diagnosis of FTD with Alzheimer's disease is difficult. 
Often there is the presence of DS features in FTD. The prognosis is usually poor for FTD, 
possibly as a result of physical complications. However, the link between DS and FTD 
has been challenged, as a result of the typically younger age of onset of FTD (Cipriani et 
al., 2012; Cooney & Hamid, 1995). It seems possible, given the close similarities in the 
presenting clinical features of those with DS and FTD, that a portion of those patients 
diagnosed with DS also suffer from FTD (Orrell & Sahakian, 1991). Difficulties in 
confirming this assertion arise from a lack of long-term follow up data and the fact that 
many of these patients have personality disorders and resist psychological/neurological 
assessment. It seems clear, though, that DS is often found in combination with other 
neuropsychiatric disorders, such as the case of a women who was diagnosed with FTD 
and secondarily with Bipolar Disorder and DS (Gálvez-Andres et al., 2007). Even so, 
many researchers support the idea of a heterogeneous etiology for DS (Lebert, 2005). For 
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example, various neuropsychological changes in FTD may contribute to different 
manifestations of DS. Apathy, for instance, would contribute to poor hygiene, and 
impairments of executive functions could lead to simplifying complex tasks, such as 
washing. 
 
DS Conclusions: It appears that DS is both neurobiologically and etiologically complex; 
often there are both psychiatric comorbidities. It has been suggested that a 
neuropsychological evaluation may be helpful in differential diagnosis and in identifying 
factors contributing to the dysfunctional behavior. In any case, further research with 
respect to how DS’s underlying neurophysiology compares and contrasts with that in 
both FTD and in the more commonly studied dementias such as Alzheimer’s may 
illuminate the quite distinctive behavioral impairments of DS. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It may be argued that certain general principles are associated with the six topics 
explored. The aberration of normal ways of perceiving and thinking in response to a 
variety of internal/external sources is consistent with our increasing knowledge of the 
neural malleability of the brain and its ability to functionally reorganize in response to 
new inputs. Most importantly, underlying neurophysiological mechanisms for most of the 
six perceptual/cognitive clusters tend to lie both in the cortical regions and lower brain 
areas which integrate sensory data both from within the body and without. For example, 
many of the specific cortical areas most implicated across the various topics have been 
identified, such as the temporoparietal junction. Often one altered phenomenological 
experience reflects the interaction among multiple brain/CNS components. For instance, 
aberrant signaling between the basal ganglia, thalamus, and prefrontal cortex can lead to 
visual/auditory hallucinations or delusional beliefs.  
Altered perceptions and cognitions tend to be on a spectrum rather than all-or-
none and likely reflect varying degrees of involvement both at the cortical and other CNS 
levels. Again, an illustration of this principle might include temporary functional 
distraction of lower-level sensory processing leading to brief experiences of bodily 
dissociation or more serious/long-term disruptions of sensory-cortical connections 
producing significant dysfunctions such as seen in depersonalization disorders. 
Obviously, interactions between cortical and lower-level functions can mutually affect 
one another, such as reflected in the “top-down” influence of our thinking and frames of 
reference on our perceptions of the world around us. 
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Another relevant parameter of altered experiences is its degree of adaptability. For 
example, in the case of some distorted beliefs such as in many delusions, impaired 
adaptability leads to the symptoms of a psychiatric disorder. However, conscious control 
of some autonomic activities like respiration and heart rhythms has potential to enhance 
functioning both emotionally and in cognitive performance tasks. Moreover, some altered 
states of consciousness such as the cortically-mediated relaxation responses associated 
with meditation, reduction of anxiety, and improved body image are obviously beneficial. 
Finally, one might speculate that the altered perception/cognition that leads to 
gross behavioral aberrations such as in Diogenes Syndrome would reveal more distinct 
and delineated brain changes. In contrast, one would be more challenged to determine the 
neural correlates of such misbeliefs as overconfidence and wishful thinking. It is 
suspected that these neural correlates are more minimal, diffuse, and less pronounced. 
Whatever the degree of experiential/behavioral as well as neurological changes 
associated with such distortions, it seems to make sense that their examination should 
enhance our understanding of the relationships between brain activity, phenomenological 
experience, and behavior. 
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